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RECENT DECISIONS 
BANKRUPTCY-PRIOR DISCHARGE WITHIN SIX YEARS AS BAR TO WAGE 
EARNER'S EXTENSION PLAN-Appellant, a debtor, sought confirmation of a 
wage earners' extension plan pursuant to Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy 
Act.1 Section 656 prohibits confirmation of a plan under Chapter XIII if the 
debtor would have been denied an ordinary discharge in bankruptcy had he 
been seeking one.2 A discharge within six years prior to the date of filing con-
stitutes a bar to such discharge.3 The referee, finding that the debtor had ob-
tained a discharge within six years, dismissed the proceedings. On appeal 
from the district court's affirmance, held, affirmed. Since a wage earner's ex-
tension plan clearly contemplates a discharge of debts, confirmation is barred 
under sections 656a and 14c(5) by a prior discharge within six years. In re 
Schlageter, 319 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1963). 
Wage earner plans, first provided for in the Chandler Act of 1938,4 
differ from ordinary bankruptcy proceedings in that their aim is not liqui-
dation of the debtor's estate, but application of future earnings to pay his 
debts.11 To commence a Chapter XIII proceeding the wage earner6 must 
file a petition alleging that he is insolvent or unable to pay his debts as 
they mature, and that he desires to effect a composition or extension, or 
both, out of his future earnings.7 An extension contemplates payment in 
full over an extended period of time, whereas a composition undertakes 
1 Sections 601-86, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1958 &: Supp. 
IV, 1963). See generally 10 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 531-742 (14th ed. 1962 &: Supp. 1962). 
2 Section 656a provides: "The court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that . . • (3) the 
debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which 
would be a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt. •.. " 52 Stat. 935 (1938), as amended, 11 
U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1958). 
a Section 14c provides: "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the 
bankrupt • • . (5) in a proceeding under this Act commenced within six years prior to 
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or had 
a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way 
of composition confirmed under this Act .•.. " 52 Stat. 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 32(c) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
4 Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938). 
IS The virtues of Chapter XIII wage earner plans have been extolled, from both a 
moral and economic standpoint, in several legal publications. See generally Abramson, 
A Comment on Habitual Proceedings, 37 REF. J. 94 (1963); Nadler, An Aid to Public 
Relations: Help the Wage Earner Make Good-(Under Chapter Xlll), 64 CoM. L.J. 38 
(1959); Riley, Chapter Xllls in the Madison Bankruptcy Court, 37 REF. J. 55 (1963). 
However, for a vigorous argument against over-emphasizing wage earner plans, see 
Walker, ls Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?, 33 REF. J. 7 
(1959). But see Allgood, Chapter Xlll-Referee Allgood of Alabama Replies to Referee 
Walker, 33 REF. J. 51 (1959). 
6 Section 606 provides: " .•. (8) 'wage earner' shall mean an individual whose principal 
income is derived from wages, salary or commissions." 64 Stat. 1134 (1950), as amended, 
11 U.S.C. § 1006 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
7 Section 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1958). As a debtor need only be 
"unable to pay his debts as they mature" he may be able to get a wage earner's extension 
plan although he has sufficient non-exempt assets to allow his creditors to recover their 
claims. See 15 STAN. L. R.Ev. 518, 521-22 (1963). 
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only partial payment. Upon notice to all creditors the court calls a meet-
ing,8 at which the debtor submits his plan, if it has not earlier been filed.9 
To be confirmed, the plan roust be approved by all secured creditors as 
well as a majority of unsecured creditors; it roust also meet the require-
ments of section 656.10 The plan need not satisfy section 656 if approved 
by all creditors, both secured and unsecured.11 If confirmed, the plan is 
binding on both debtor and creditor,12 and if the debtor completes the 
plan and payments thereunder the court will discharge him.18 He may also 
be discharged after three years, although not having completed the pay-
ments, if his failure was due to circumstances for which he could not be held 
accountable.14 
Section 656a(3) prohibits confirmation of a plan under Chapter XIII if 
the debtor is guilty of any act that would constitute a bar to discharge 
in a straight bankruptcy proceeding. A prior discharge within six years is 
such an act.15 The word "plan" is defined in section 606(7)16 to include 
a composition, extension, or both, and there is a further reference to this 
definition in section 623.17 A literal reading of the statute must therefore 
result in a finding that confirmation of an extension plan will be denied 
if the debtor has received a prior discharge in bankruptcy within six years. 
It is settled that a prior discharge within six years bars the confirmation of 
a Chapter XIII composition.18 The question is whether sections 14c(5) and 
656a(3), in combination, similarly preclude the confirmation of an ex-
tension plan-in other words, whether or not the statute should be read 
literally. 
The view tl).at an extension is not barred by a prior discharge in bank-
ruptcy within six years has been taken by two federal district courts in 
8 Sections 632-33(2), 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1032-33(2) (1958). 
9 The plan must meet the requirements of § 646, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C, § 1046 
(1958). The plan "-may," but need not, deal with secured creditors. 
10 Section 652, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958). A "majority" of unsecured 
creditors means a majority both of the number of creditors and of the amount of claims 
allowed. 
11 Section 651, 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1051 (1958). 
12 Section 657, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1057 (1958). 
18 Section 660, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958). 
14 Section 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958). Because of this section many 
courts require that a Chapter XIII plan be capable of completion within three years, 
although there is no statutory limit on the length of time a plan may run. See NADLER, 
BANKRUPTCY 836 (1948). 
15 A discharge, on its face, is not an act of guilt on the part of the debtor. See In -re 
Goldberg, 53 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1931). 
16 Section 606(7), 64 Stat. 1134 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
17 Section 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1958). 
18 Section 14c(5) specifically lists confirmation of a Chapter XIII composition plan as 
a bar to subsequent discharge within six years, and a discharge would bar confirmation 
of a subsequent composition within the six-year period. In -re Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400 
(2d Cir. 1933); cf. In -re Jenson, 200 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 
(1953) (alternative holding) (Chapter XI extension barred by prior discharge in bank-
ruptcy). 
1964] RECENT DECISIONS 519 
In re Mahaley19 and In re Sharp.2° Compositions and extensions were 
there distinguished on the ground that the latter are not discharges since 
they contemplate repayment of debts in full; however, compositions re-
semble discharges in that they involve a reduction of debts.21 Finding the 
purpose of section l 4c(5)-prevention of the development of a class of 
habitual users of the Bankruptcy Act22-to be generally inconsistent with 
the purpose of Chapter XIII, which is to encourage extension plans,23 these 
courts turned to section 602,24 which states that the provisions of Chapters 
I through VII (which include section 14c(5)) do not apply if they are in-
consistent with the provisions of Chapter XIII. Having already distinguished 
extensions and compositions, they were able to hold that section 14c(5) does 
not apply to the confirmation of Chapter XIII extension plans without 
having to say the same of compositions, which are clearly subject to the 
six-year rule. The Mahaley-Sharp line of reasoning, therefore, avoids the 
result of a literal interpretation of the statute by, in effect, reading a 
proviso into section 656a(3) that section l 4c(5) shall not preclude the con-
firmation of an extension plan. 
The principal case, which is the first federal court of appeals decision 
holding that an extension plan is barred by a prior discharge within six 
years,211 rejected the Mahaley-Sharp distinction between extension plans 
and compositions. The court held that a discharge is clearly contemplated 
by the statute in both types of plans; it therefore saw no reason to exempt 
extensions from the six-year rule. The same conclusion was reached by a 
federal district court in In re Bingham,26 where the court cited strong 
19 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960). 
20 205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962). 
21 This distinction has been accepted by Congress. Prior to 1938 there was a split 
among the courts as to whether compositions were subject to the six-year rule. In re 
Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1933) (prior composition held to bar a discharge). Contra, 
In re Goldberg, 53 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1931) (prior composition does not bar a composition). 
In 1938 § 14c(5) was changed to include compositions as a cause of bar. In pointing out 
that there was no need to include prior extensions in section 14c(5), H.R. REP. No. 1409, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1937), states that, as a composition under Chapter XIII acts as a 
discharge, there is no reason not to treat it as such, but that an extension differs from a 
composition in that it operates to pay debts in full. See also In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 
(10th Cir. 1962); In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp. 
660 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), afj'd sub nom. Fishman v. Verlin, 255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958); In re 
Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943). But see 15 STAN. L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1963), 
for an argument that the distinction between extensions and compositions, though well 
documented, is unrealistic because under either plan a debtor may reduce his obligations 
to a certain extent .. 
22 See In re Sharp, 205 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Mo. 1962). 
23 Id. at 787. 
2-i 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1958). 
25 Edins v. Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc., 315 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1963), followed 
the Mahaley-Sharp view in a brief per curiam opinion. 
20 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bingham v. Yingling 
Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961). In this case the debtor applied for confirma-
tion of an extension plan, having received a prior confirmation of a Chapter XIII plan 
within six years. The court was unclear as to whether the prior Chapter XIII plan was by 
way of composition or extension. In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962), which in-
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policy reasons in favor of this result, namely, loss of interest to the creditors 
for the duration of the plan and the danger that a secured creditor might 
lose his security.27 The Bingham-Schlageter position is not without merit. 
It may be undesirable in some circumstances to confirm as a matter of 
course an extension plan within six years after a prior discharge.28 The most 
common problem in allowing frequent extension plans is that the debtor 
will allow himself to become perennially over-committed, the result being 
the creation of a class of debtors habitually under the protection of the 
Bankruptcy Act.29 
Considering all the arguments, however, the Mahaley-Sharp position 
seems to achieve a sounder result.80 Although those courts disregarded the 
literal terms of the statute, their conclusion that extension plans should be 
exempted from the six-year rule is so strongly supported by policy con-
siderations as to justify the vague reasoning employed. In the majority of 
cases, confirmation of an extension plan is desirable from both the debtors' 
and the creditors' point of view. The debtor is free from the harassment 
of garnishment and attachment by creditors while he attempts to repay his 
debts in full. It has been said that by utilizing an extension plan the cost of 
relief to the debtor is lowered, and he receives an education in budgeting 
as well.81 Moreover, confirmation of such a plan is desirable from a creditor's 
volved two consecutive extension plans, purported to overrule the Bingham case, stating 
that the two cases involved "similar facts." See 47 IowA L. REv. 155 (1961), for a conclusion 
that the prior plan in the Bingham case was by way of composition. This seems to be the 
better explanation of the case. 
The argument that a creditor may stand to lose his security must at least be qualified 
by the fact that no plan can be confirmed under Chapter XIII without the acceptance of 
all secured creditors whose claims are covered by the plan. See Kennedy, Hospitality for 
Repeaters Under the Bankruptcy Act, 68 CoM. L.J. 117, 123 &: n.41 (1963). 
27 In re Bingham, 190 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Bingham v. Yingling Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961). 
28 There is a danger that the debtor may use the Chapter XIII extension plan as a 
merely temporary measure to hold off unsecured creditors while the secured creditors 
collect, then drop the proceeding or convert it into straight bankruptcy after having 
paid off on property which will be exempted. See Walker, supra note 5, at 8. He may 
also plan to get a release later under § 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958), 
without having completed the plan. 
29 See Walker, supra note 5; Wiese, Bankruptcy Discharge Does Not Prohibit Chapter 
XIII Proceeding, 15 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 22 (1960); 15 STAN. L. REV. 518 (1963). 
so Most writers seem to agree that wage earner extension plans should be freely 
available, notwithstanding prior discharges. See Abramson, supra note 5; Nadler, supra 
note 5; Riley, supra note 5. It has been uniformly held that successive Chapter XIII 
extension plans are not subject to the six-year rule. In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th 
Cir. 1962); In re Autry, 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kan. 1962). 
81 Riley, supra note 5. See Kennedy, Debt Pooling Arrangements vs. Chapter XIII 
Proceedings, 46 ILL. B.J. 816 (1958), reprinted in 32 REF. J. 109 (1958), for a conclusion 
that, in an average case, the costs to the debtor of a Chapter XIII plan, are about equal to 
those of private debt pooling; however, in the former case the fees incl?de compe~ent 
legal aid to the debtor, while in the latter they do not. See also Mauhtz, Operations 
Under Chapter XIII, 27 REF. J. 68 (1953), for examples of how wage earner plans in 
Alabama have been made more economical. 
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point of view in most cases.32 Illustratively, a man's creditors stand to gain 
very little if the debtor loses his job as a result of garnishment. Nor is the 
loss of interest to creditors nearly so severe as is the case when a debtor 
receives an ordinary discharge in bankruptcy.33 
The trend in recent years has been toward a wider use of extension 
plans,34 especially since the wage limit on eligibility for Chapter XIII plans 
was removed in 1959. The question of the six-year rule, therefore, becomes 
more significant in the face of the need for a rule that will insure maximum 
availability of Chapter XIII extension plans to the wage earner. In recog-
nition of this need, the National Bankruptcy Conference has approved 
amendments to sections l 4c(5)315 and 656a(3)36 which would, in effect, 
codify the Mahaley-Sharp view.37 
If, however, extension plans are to be made freely available to wage 
earners, the courts must remain alert to possible abuses. Perhaps the best 
safeguard is found in section 656,38 which provides that a plan cannot be 
confirmed unless it is submitted in good faith and in the best interests of 
the creditors.39 Another safeguard consists of the creditors themselves, as no 
Chapter XIII plan may be confirmed without the consent of all the secured 
creditors and a majority of the unsecured creditors whose claims are covered 
by the plan.40 When courts discover after confirmation that debtors have 
entered upon extension plans intending to use them merely as a means to 
hold their creditors at bay,41 these plans could be dismissed pursuant to 
82 See generally Allgood, supra note 5; Riley, supra note 5. 
88 Under Chapter XIII plans creditors collect a far greater proportion of what is 
owed them than in straight bankruptcy proceedings. In 1962 asset bankruptcy cases (in 
which creditors collect far more than in non-asset or nominal asset cases), the total 
payments to creditors were only $52,404,479 out of $274,834,940 total indebtedness, or 
19.l %, Comparatively, in Chapter XIII proceedings $6,344,660 was paid to creditors 
holding $6,555,129 in claims allowed-about 97% satisfaction. ADMINIS'IRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS FOR PERIOD ENDING 
JUNE 30, 1962. 
34 Decreases were reported in all types of bankruptcy proceedings in 1962 except 
those filed under Chapter XII (real estate arrangements) and Chapter XIII. Chapter XII 
proceedings increased 19.3%, but only from 31 to 37 cases. Chapter XIII proceedings 
showed an increase from 19,723 to 22,880 cases, an increment of 16,0%, Comparatively, 
there was an increase of only 1137 cases, or 0.8% in all other types of bankruptcy proceed-
ings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 7. 
315 See Proceedings of Nat'l Bankruptcy Conf. Ann. Meeting, Oct. 25-26, 1962, p. 11, cited 
in Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124. The amendment excepts discharges on completion of 
extension plans under § 660, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958), from the six-year 
rule. The implication is that a discharge on completion of a composition under § 660, 
and any discharge under § 661, 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1958), would be 
treated as a regular discharge, subject to the six-year rule. See Kennedy, supra note 26. 
36 Summary of Proceedings of Nat'l Bankruptcy Conf. 1961 Ann. Meeting, Res. No. 2, 
cited in Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124. 
37 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 124. 
38 Sections 656a(2), (4), 66 Stat. 437 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1056(a)(2), (4) (1958). 
39 Compare 15 STAN. L. REv. 518, 523 (1963), for a speculation that In re Sharp may 
create a norm of confirming Chapter XIII extension plans without regard to prior dis-
charges, compositions, or extensions. 
40 Section 652, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1958). 
H See text accompanying note 28 supra. It has been suggested that the courts should 
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section 671.42 Perhaps the greatest ·fear among those who oppose the exemp-
tion of extension plans from the six-year rule is that this will expand the 
class of perennially over-committed wage earners who are constantly under 
the protection of the courts. Such a possibility may be mitigated by setting 
a statutory limit on the number of extension plans available to the debtor. 
The court may also find a plan submitted by a debtor who has filed for 
relief an extensive number of times not to be in the best interests of the 
creditors. Despite some risk of abuse, these safeguards would appear suf-
ficiently reliable to justify adherence to the policy of making extension plans 
available without the burdening limitation of the six-year rule. 
Anthony Lynch 
treat a plan calling for the rejection of the debtor's ex.ecutory contracts (pursuant to 
§§ 642, 646(~. 52 Stat. 933, 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1042, 1046(6) (1958) as a composition 
and therefore subject to the six-year rule. See 15 STAN. L. REv. 518 (1963). It is claimed that 
such a procedure would make the distinction between ex.tensions and compositions more 
realistic because an ex.tension plan which calls for the rejection of executory contracts tends 
to reduce the debtor's total obligations. This rationale for distinguishing this type of ex.ten• 
sion plan is not convincing. Pursuant to § 642, the debtor will have to pay reasonable 
damages to those whose contracts are rejected, and therefore the party whose executory 
contract is rejected is compensated for any loss he may sustain. 
42 Section 671 provides that a plan may be dismissed for fraud in its procurement. 
52 Stat. 937 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1071 (1958). Perhaps the construction of the word "fraud" 
could be expanded to reach debtors who do not intend to complete their extension plans. 
